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Non-domination and democratic legitimacy
Christian F. Rostbøll*
Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
While many regard equality as the moral foundation of democracy,
republican theory grounds democracy in freedom as non-domination. The
grounding of democracy in freedom has been criticized for relying on
either an Aristotelian perfectionism or a Rousseauian equation of the peo-
ple in their collective capacity and the people understood severally. The
republican theory of freedom and democracy has the resources to meet
these criticisms. But the most systematic elaboration of republicanism, that
of Philip Pettit, achieves this by turning the relationship between freedom
and democracy into an instrumental relationship in a manner open to
objections. Instead, republicanism should offer a justiﬁcation of democracy
that also has a non-instrumental dimension. This revised republican free-
dom argument for democracy has advantages compared to the equality
argument for democracy, including a better explanation of democratic
procedures.
Keywords: democracy; republicanism; freedom; non-instrumental value
1. Introduction
One important contribution of the revival of republicanism is that it brings
freedom back into the debate about democratic legitimacy.1 Freedom argu-
ments for democracy have been criticized for relying on either an objectionable
Aristotelian perfectionism (the idea that political activity is the highest good)
or an untenable Rousseauian equation of the people in their collective capacity
and the people understood severally. This has led some contemporary political
philosophers to ground democracy in equality rather than in freedom or to sug-
gest that the value of democracy is only instrumental (Christiano 1996, 2008,
Waldron 1999, Estlund 2008, Arneson 2009). My claim is that the republican
conception of freedom as non-domination contains valuable theoretical
resources to overcome the objections to freedom arguments for democracy.
However, the most elaborate and systematic defense of republicanism, that of
Philip Pettit, sees the relationship between freedom and democracy as
instrumental and thereby fails fully to exploit the potential of the ideal of non-
domination for grounding democracy in freedom.
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© 2015 Taylor & Francis
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 2015
Vol. 18, No. 4, 424–439, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2015.1033862
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
op
en
ha
ge
n U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 0
3:0
9 0
3 A
ug
us
t 2
01
5 
In this paper, I argue that republicanism can contribute a strong non-instru-
mental justiﬁcation of democracy. The ground of democratic legitimacy is not
merely that democracy instrumentally promotes non-domination, but also that
it is non-instrumentally part of democracy to relate citizens to one another in
such a way that no person is the political master of another. Democracy, ide-
ally, affords everyone a status freedom that secures that no one is in a position
to dominate another in the political process or to use political power to domi-
nate another.
In the ﬁrst section, I explain the distinction between instrumental and non-
instrumental justiﬁcations of democracy and suggest that the contribution of
republican theory is that it casts this debate in a new light by focusing on free-
dom rather than equality alone. The second section argues that Berlin’s dichot-
omy between two concepts of liberty is the source of hostility to freedom
arguments for democracy and that from a republican perspective, we can leave
this dichotomy behind. The third section argues that Pettit’s republican theory
can reinvigorate the freedom argument for democracy, but that his assertion
that democracy has no intrinsic value must be rejected. In Section 4, I show
how the notion of freedom as non-domination can contribute to overcoming
some common objections to freedom arguments for democracy. Section 5
seeks to respond to one epistemic objection to intrinsic accounts of democracy
by showing how the ideal of non-domination must award priority to procedure
over outcome.
2. Instrumental and non-instrumental justiﬁcations of democracy
The normative question of political legitimacy concerns whether the exercise
of political power should be accepted as valid by those over whom it is exer-
cised. Our question is the ground of citizens’ content-independent pro tanto
obligation to obey democratically exercised political power (Simmons 1999,
Pettit 2012, pp. 137–138, 140, Rostbøll 2013, p. 34). What the ground of
democratic legitimacy is obviously depends on what we mean by democracy,
but I will proceed on the assumption that we have a shared, if vague, under-
standing of democracy that can guide the investigation. Moreover, our under-
standing of democracy is itself dependent on our understanding of what is
required for political legitimacy.
In discussing democratic legitimacy, we may distinguish between the
instrumental and the intrinsic value of democratic decision-making (Christiano
2012). The instrumental justiﬁcation of democracy holds, ﬁrst, that the form of
government that ought to be instituted is the one with the best consequences
and, second, that democracy is the form of government with the best conse-
quences (Arneson 2009, p. 197). Thus, on the instrumental view, the value of
democracy is derived from the consequences to which it is believed to be the
best (feasible) means. The intrinsic justiﬁcation of democracy invokes virtues
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 425
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inherent in democratic decision-making whose value is independent of their
consequences. Thus, on the intrinsic argument, democratic legitimacy is
explained with reference to something that is internal to and expressed by
democratic decision-making.
A prominent, contemporary non-instrumental justiﬁcation of democracy
defends ‘democracy as a non-instrumentally just procedure’ because it treats
citizen as equals (Grifﬁn 2003, p. 118). In Thomas Christiano’s (2008, p. 96)
non-instrumental account, democracy ‘is a publicly clear way of recognizing
and afﬁrming the equality of citizens.’ According to Christiano, the equality
argument is a superior alternative to the freedom argument for democracy. In
short, he believes that it is not possible for democracy to make citizens free or
self-governing, but democracy can treat citizens fairly or as equals (Christiano
1996, p. 42). Thus, the equality argument might be seen as a product of ‘de-
spair about assessing legitimacy in terms of freedom’ (Pettit 2012, p. 148).
David Estlund has challenged the intrinsic argument for democracy, arguing
that if all we cared about were fairness or equal treatment, ﬂipping a coin
would do just as well (Estlund 2008, ch. 4). According to Estlund, the epis-
temic quality of outcomes has priority over procedural values in explaining
democratic legitimacy.
Both the intrinsic justiﬁcation of democracy and the epistemic critique of
this justiﬁcation concentrate on equal treatment, while the importance of free-
dom is either ignored or rejected in the debate (Christiano 2009, Estlund
2009). My aim was to show that republicanism can contribute to revitalizing
the freedom argument for democracy. On the one hand, the republican ground-
ing of democracy in freedom as non-domination is less susceptible to the stan-
dard objections to freedom arguments for democracy. On the other hand, the
republican freedom argument for democracy can explain why procedures have
priority over outcomes. Before we can show this, however, we must review
the objections to freedom arguments for democracy and ask whether freedom
and democracy are related instrumentally or non-instrumentally in republi-
canism.
When we view the question of democratic legitimacy in terms of free-
dom, as republicanism encourages us to do, the ﬁrst question is whether
democracy is instrumental to freedom or intrinsic to freedom. Democracy is
instrumental to freedom if the value of democracy in relation to freedom is
that of a means that furthers a valuable end. In the instrumental justiﬁcation,
democracy has no value in itself apart from the value it derives from being
a (causal) means to freedom. The relationship between democracy and
freedom is intrinsic if democracy is an inherent part of freedom and if
freedom is not merely an external consequence of democratic decision-
making. On the intrinsic argument, the relationship between freedom and
democracy is necessary or internal, meaning that we cannot have one with-
out the other.
426 C.F. Rostbøll
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3. Beyond Berlin’s two concepts of liberty
Criticisms of freedom arguments for democracy are often framed within the
Berlinian dichotomy between negative and positive freedom, and they often
share Isaiah Berlin’s (1969b, p. 130) contention that ‘there is no necessary con-
nexion between individual liberty and democratic rule.’ The rejection of free-
dom arguments for democracy concurs with Berlin on two counts: that
democracy is conceptually and normatively different from individual liberty
and that positive understandings of freedom tend to lead to oppression. Berlin
also suggests that one can enjoy the same kind of and as much liberty in non-
democratic as in democratic regimes. It is less clear whether critics of the free-
dom argument for democracy share this view, but I shall later suggest that they
fail to entertain the possibility that the liberty enjoyed in a democracy is of a
different kind than the liberty you can experience in non-democratic regimes.
Recall Berlin’s conceptualization of negative and positive liberty, which
has been so inﬂuential and, I think, so unfruitful for a proper understanding of
the relationship between freedom and democracy. Berlin deﬁnes negative free-
dom as the absence of ‘deliberate interference of other human beings within
the area in which I could otherwise act’ (Berlin 1969b, p. 122). Call this view
‘freedom as non-interference.’ It is this understanding of individual liberty that
Berlin thinks has no necessary connection to democracy. For Berlin, there is
clearly no conceptual relation between negative freedom and democracy, and
even in empirical terms, he notes that a liberal-minded despot sometimes
allows more negative freedom than democratic majorities (Berlin 1969b,
p. 129). However, Berlin accepts that democracies ‘on the whole’ may better
protect negative freedom than non-democratic regimes (Berlin 1969b, p. 130).
The positive concept of freedom is less clearly deﬁned by Berlin, and per-
haps, it involves more than one idea (Miller 1991, p. 10). At one point, Berlin
differentiates negative freedom as a question of ‘What am I free to do or be?’
and positive freedom as a question of ‘By whom am I ruled?’ (Berlin 1969b,
p. 130). Positive freedom is about ruling oneself and connects directly to
democracy as the only form of government in which the ideal is to be ruled by
oneself. For Berlin, the desire to be negatively free and the desire to rule one-
self are not desires ‘for the same thing’ (Berlin 1969b, p. 131). Thus, there is
no normative connection between the two ideals in his view either. Berlin’s
view that one can be as negatively free under a despot as in a democracy pre-
supposes that the freedom enjoyed under the two forms of regime is the same
kind of freedom. Thomas Hobbes (1996, p. 143) explicitly formulated such a
view: ‘Whether a commonwealth be monarchical, or popular, the freedom is
still the same.’ It is exactly this view that republicans reject (Pettit 1997,
pp. 38ff., Skinner 1998, pp. 85ff.). My question is whether a rejection of that
view does not push us in the direction of according democracy intrinsic value?
What distinguishes republicans from Berlin is not the criticism of positive
freedom, but the idea that it is interference from which one must be free.
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 427
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In focusing on the absence of domination, Pettit wants to make two main
points against the notion of freedom as non-interference. He claims, ﬁrst, that
not all interference compromises freedom and, second, that not only interfer-
ence compromises freedom. The ﬁrst point is meant to reveal that there are
qualitative differences between forms of interference. Speciﬁcally, Pettit seeks
to show that only arbitrary or, in his most recent formulation, ‘uncontrolled’
interference compromises freedom (Pettit 2012, p. 58). The second point is
important for the alternative understanding of the relationship between freedom
and democracy that one ﬁnds in republicanism compared to Berlin. Before we
get to that, we need to consider two objections to positive conceptions of
freedom, because they are seen as detrimental to the possibility of giving a
freedom argument for democracy.
The ﬁrst objection to freedom arguments for democracy is targeted at the
Rousseauian idea that in a democracy people are free because they are gov-
erned by themselves, the people.2 Many, beginning with John Stuart Mill, have
pointed out the implausibility of the view that obeying the will of the people is
to obey oneself: ‘The “people” who exercise the power are not always the same
people as those over whom power is exercised, and the “self-government” spo-
ken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest’
(Mill 1989, pp. 7ff.). Many republican thinkers share the view that the freedom
of the collective cannot be identiﬁed with the freedom of the plurality of per-
sons composing the people (Arendt 1990, pp. 76ff., Richardson 2002,
pp. 59ff.). According to Pettit, the belief that when ‘the people’ rule, ‘people’
cannot be dominated rests on a ‘fallacy of equivocation.’ The trouble is that
‘the people’ who rule refers to a collectivity, while ‘people’ who are ruled
refers to individuals taken severally or distributively. And ‘it is quite possible
that the people, understood collectively, should dominate the people, under-
stood severally’ (Pettit 1999, p. 174). Republicans, therefore, give a different
freedom argument for democracy than the one suggested by Rousseau. In par-
ticular, they advocate a form of freedom where the individual is not absorbed
into the collective.
The second objection to freedom arguments for democracy is directed at
the idea that political action is the highest good and the only true exercise of
freedom. We should note that this freedom argument for democracy – and
thus, the objection against it – differs from the one we have just discussed, as
one of the former’s main exponents, Hannah Arendt, rejects Rousseau’s idea
of popular sovereignty (Arendt 1990, pp. 76ff., Canovan 1992, p. 212,
Rostbøll 2014, pp. 28–33).3 For Arendt, the value of political action does not
come from its securing collective self-rule, but rather from the praxis of acting
among free and equal citizens (Arendt 1958, ch. 5, 1993). The idea is that
democracy (and only democracy) provides all citizens with the possibility of
taking part in a speciﬁc form of activity, political action, which in itself is the
only true exercise of freedom. The objection to this freedom argument is, in
428 C.F. Rostbøll
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short, that it relies on a sectarian conception of the good. Pettit distances his
own republicanism from this neo-Aristotelian freedom argument, insisting that
while the republican tradition ﬁnds value and importance in democratic participa-
tion, it does not treat it as a bed rock value. Democratic participation may be
essential to the republic, but that is because it is necessary for promoting the
enjoyment of freedom as non-domination, not because of its independent attrac-
tions. (Pettit 1997, p. 8; see also 2012, pp. 12, 18)
Part of his reasoning here is to stress that ‘the [republican] ideal is compatible
with modern pluralistic forms of society’ (Pettit 1997, p. 8).
We can now see why the Berlinian dichotomy between negative freedom
and positive freedom is unfruitful for understanding the relationship between
freedom and democracy. On the one hand, the conceptualization of freedom as
non-interference leads to the counter-intuitive view that we cannot explain the
value of democracy in relation to personal freedom at all, as if the cause of
freedom were irrelevant to the justiﬁcation of democracy (Pettit 2012, p. 150).
On the other hand, Berlin understands the view of freedom that is connected
to democracy, positive freedom, in such antagonistic terms that further explo-
rations are seen as normatively suspicious. Of course, some might be per-
suaded that there is nothing more to say about freedom and democracy than
that they are not internally related. My suggestion is that this is too quick and
that before we are warranted in so concluding, we must consider the republican
claim that there is a third concept of freedom. While freedom as non-domina-
tion is a negative conception, it is held to be a freedom that can be enjoyed
only in a free state or a state with self-government (Skinner 1998, pp. 23ff.).
The contention that freedom as non-domination can be enjoyed only in a state
with self-government points to the idea that the relationship between freedom
and democracy must be seen, in republicanism, as necessary and not merely
contingent.
4. Freedom and democracy in Pettit’s republicanism
As mentioned, Pettit agrees that democratic participation is important in republi-
canism, but he insists that this has nothing to do with its ‘independent attrac-
tions.’ The importance of democratic control comes ‘not from any deﬁnitional
connection with liberty, but from the fact that it is a means of furthering liberty’
(Pettit 1997, p. 30). Pettit suggests that freedom as non-domination can be
deﬁned independently of the concept of democracy and that the value of non-
domination differs from the value of democracy. Hence, he denies that there is
an intrinsic relationship between freedom and democracy, both deﬁnitionally
and normatively. This seems to present a clear case of ‘democratic instrumen-
talism,’ i.e. that democratic institutions are defensible only insofar as they are
the best means of furthering non-democratic ends, here non-domination.4 And,
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 429
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thus, we might think Pettit would be in agreement with Berlin’s conclusion that
there is no necessary connection between individual liberty and democracy.
But, Pettit argues that this conclusion of Berlin’s reveals a shortcoming of free-
dom as non-interference. The latter conception
forces us … to say that democratization is not bound to make government more
freedom-friendly. On the contrary … it is bound to be the case that democratiza-
tion does nothing to relieve the essential enmity that exists between coercive law
and government, on the one hand, and individual freedom on the other. (Pettit
1999, p. 170)
For Pettit, ‘only the republican conception holds out any hope for sustaining
the claim that democratization can make government freedom-friendly’ (Pettit
1999, p. 163; see also Pettit 2012, pp. 146ff.). The relationship between free-
dom as non-domination and democracy is much closer than the one between
freedom as non-interference and democracy, according to Pettit. How is this
the case?
Remember that while Berlin accepts that democracies might ‘on the whole’
be better at protecting freedom (as non-interference) than non-democracies he
sees this as a contingent matter. Pettit, in opposition to Berlin, argues that
democratized states represent a lesser assault on republican freedom than non-
democratic states and not just contingently but ‘just in virtue of being
democratized’ (Pettit 1999, p. 163). His aim is to explain that coercive law and
government are not necessarily the enemy of liberty and that democratization
is what is required for law and government not to be dominating or hostile to
freedom. What is noteworthy and valuable in Pettit’s republicanism is the
attempt to highlight this mutually supportive relationship between freedom and
democracy without appealing to a perfectionist valuation of political action or
to the idea that a law given by the people cannot dominate the people. My
question is whether it is possible to sustain the claim that there is a robust rela-
tionship between freedom and democracy while maintaining, as Pettit does,
that democracy is an external means to freedom as non-domination.5
Consider why Pettit believes that only the republican conception of free-
dom can sustain the claim that democratic states, in virtue of being democratic,
are freedom-consistent. Deﬁning freedom not as absence of interference but
rather as non-domination means not only that there can be domination without
interference (as in the case of the non-interfering master), but also that there
can be interference without domination. What democratic governments ideally
do, according to Pettit, is to substitute one form of interference with a com-
pletely different kind. And ‘interference occurs without the loss of liberty when
the interference is not arbitrary and does not represent a form of domination’
(Pettit 1997, p. 35).
Pettit’s understanding of when state interference is non-dominating (and
hence politically legitimate) seems to have changed from his earlier writings to
430 C.F. Rostbøll
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On the people’s terms (2012). In the earlier writings, from Republicanism
(1997) to A theory of freedom (2001), the issue was determined in epistemic
terms. Thus, he held that interference is non-arbitrary when it is ‘designed to
track people’s interests according to their ideas’ (Pettit 1997, p. 149) or, more
precisely, ‘to the extent that it is forced to track people’s common avowable
interests’ (Pettit 2001, p. 139; see also Pettit 1999, p. 176). In this formulation,
democracy is connected to freedom because it is a form of government that is
designed and forced to track people’s interests as they see them and to interfere
exclusively on that basis.
There is an ambiguity in the idea that democracies are designed to track
common interests, an ambiguity that must be clariﬁed so as to determine
whether the relationship between freedom and democracy is instrumental or
intrinsic (Rostbøll 2014, p. 30). One possibility is to read it as an output-based
justiﬁcation of democracy, which says that democratic laws do not compromise
freedom because they in fact track people’s common avowable interests. In a
way, this is the most natural reading in light of the clear instrumentalist
formulations quoted earlier. But this justiﬁcation implies that democracy is
freedom-friendly if and only if its outputs infallibly track common avowable
interests and is thus susceptible to the objection that democracies cannot pro-
vide an infallible method for making non-arbitrary decisions (Bellamy 2008,
pp. 164ff.).
A second reading focuses on the fact that Pettit says that democracies are
designed to track people’s interests. If what makes democracy valuable is that
it is designed to treat everyone’s interests equally, its value comes not from the
fact that democratic decisions actually do so, but rather from the equal status
afforded everyone in the democratic process. This reading tends toward grant-
ing democracy intrinsic value. Pettit excludes himself from endorsing this view
when he rejects the notion that democracy can be intrinsically justiﬁed. Here
he fails to see that there are other intrinsic justiﬁcations of democracy than just
Aristotelian or Rousseauian ones and that his own theory of freedom might
itself contain the theoretical resources for formulating such a justiﬁcation.
In On the people’s terms, Pettit seems to come closer to the second possi-
bility, which focuses on democracy’s inherent virtues rather than on outputs.
Thus, in this more recent work the epistemic idea of tracking interests is absent
from the account of freedom-consistent interference and political legitimacy.6
The question, now, is whether the interference is controlled by the interferee
(Pettit 2012, pp. 58–59, 146ff.). Accordingly, ‘if the citizenry control state dis-
cretion in a suitable manner … then the imposition of a social order on those
citizens will not take away their freedom and will count as fully legitimate’
(Pettit 2012, p. 160). The citizens control the government in a suitable manner
if they have equal access to inﬂuence and control the government. That Pettit
now eschews an instrumental or, more speciﬁcally, epistemic account of demo-
cratic legitimacy is also indicated when he notes that instrumental theories of
legitimacy ‘will only have plausibility … on the assumption that no effective
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 431
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state can preserve people’s freedom’ (Pettit 2012, p. 148). As I understand
him, the point is that we do not need the epistemic argument for democracy if
we can show democracy to be freedom-consistent. This, I think, is the right
kind of argument to make. However, I suggest that this view requires a rejec-
tion of Pettit’s earlier claim that the relationship between freedom and democ-
racy is instrumental rather than intrinsic.
In Republicanism, Pettit implicitly grants intrinsic value to democracy
when he defends republicanism against the charge that it confuses security and
freedom, means and end (Pettit 1997, pp. 46, 73ff.). He does so when noting,
ﬁrst, that republicans are concerned about security not against interference as
such, but against interference on an arbitrary basis and, second, that only secu-
rity of a certain sort is compatible with republican freedom. It is the second
point that is relevant for our discussion. ‘Trying to secure the absence of arbi-
trary interference’, Pettit (1997, pp. 73–74) states, ‘is not trying to promote it
by no matter what means’. In particular, he excludes security that is achieved
by strategic means of deference, indulgence, and anticipation: Non-domination
‘presents a picture of a free life in which the need for strategy is minimized’
(Pettit 1997, p. 87). This requires political institutions in which everyone has
equal social standing, and thus, democracy seems to be necessary for such a
free life. Is it not exactly an intrinsic value of democracy that it is inherently a
form of government in which the need for strategic deference is minimized,
and where citizens ‘do not have to bow and scrape’ and ‘would each be able
to walk tall, live without shame or indignity, and look one another in the eye
without reason for fear or deference’ (Pettit 1997, p. 87, 2012, p. 3)? My sug-
gestion is that Pettit’s theory, despite his intentions, contains valuable insights
into the intrinsic values of democracy. The picture of free life depicted by the
ideal of non-domination is not so much a consequence of democracy, as it is
constituted by democracy in the very relations it creates among citizens. That
no one is the political master of another is an ideal that is inherent to
democracy.
5. Responding to objections to freedom arguments
In the idea of freedom as non-domination, we can ﬁnd resources to overcome
some of the objections to freedom arguments for democracy, which are often
implicitly based on the notion of freedom as non-interference. Christiano has
objected to the freedom argument for democracy in the following terms:
‘Democracy is a system of decision-making where each is dependent on the
assent or actions of many others to secure what they want’ (Christiano 1996,
p. 25, emphasis added). Such dependence on the assent of others is ‘a paradig-
matic case of unfreedom’ (Christiano 1996, p. 24). This objection relies on an
ideal of freedom as non-interference that is best achieved in isolation from
society. Non-domination, by contrast, refers to a ‘status’ that can be achieved
only ‘among other people, none of whom dominates you … It is a social ideal
432 C.F. Rostbøll
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whose realization presupposes the presence of a number of mutually interactive
agents’ (Pettit 1997, p. 66).
To respond to Christiano’s objection, we must clarify the domain in which
democratic legitimacy is at issue. From a republican perspective, it is important
to distinguish between the interference that the state chooses to impose on citi-
zens and the dependence and interference that are independently necessitated.
Republicans hold ‘that being required to live with others in a particular, coer-
cively regulated state is the product of a will-independent constraint and not a
dominating imposition’ (Pettit 2012, p. 165). Human beings must live in politi-
cal society under law because they are social beings and because equal free-
dom requires coercively enforced laws (Ripstein 2009). Consequently, the
baseline for judging the relationship between freedom and democracy is not a
situation in which we live isolated from other human beings or without laws;
the question of political legitimacy arises in a political context of mutual
dependence and the existence of a coercively enforced legal order. The
advantage of the conception of freedom as non-domination over freedom as
non-interference is that it makes clear that the fact that no one can have per-
sonal control over the state is compatible with freedom, since it is not a result
of the imposition of an alien will. Hence, Christiano’s objection is too broad
insofar as it fails to distinguish between different ways in which one is hin-
dered in fulﬁlling one’s aims. It is only hindrances that are imposed by the
state that need to be legitimated.
Furthermore, the ideal of freedom as non-domination suggests that freedom
is not just about getting what one wants, as Christiano’s objection assumes.
There are two reasons why not being hindered in getting what one wants is
not identical to freedom, though the second is more important for our pur-
poses. First, freedom can be limited not just by others removing desired
options, but also by others removing undesired options. Otherwise, freedom
could be increased by extinguishing one’s desires, which is absurd (Berlin
1969a, pp. xxviii ff., Pettit 2012, pp. 30ff.). Second, it is not indifferent in
freedom terms how you get what you want. By ingratiating yourself with the
more powerful you might get what you want, but you are not free in the sense
of being non-dominated. The intuition in support of this view is that it is just
as absurd to say that one can make oneself free by accommodating oneself to
the more powerful, as it is to say that one can become freer by extinguishing
one’s desires (Pettit 2012, pp. 64ff.). In relation to democratic legitimacy, the
point is that democratic procedures exactly are procedures that aim to secure
that you do not have to ingratiate yourself with the powerful to gain inﬂuence.
These points do not fully answer Christiano’s objection, but the move from
freedom as non-interference to freedom as non-domination can better explain
how democracy contributes to freedom. Democracy cannot eliminate human
interdependence or the need for coercive interference (itself a requirement of
equal freedom), but it can in principle end domination. To be non-dominated
does not require independence from others or that one assents to every law to
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which one is subject. It requires, rather, a certain standing among those with
whom one is interdependent. That you cannot get what you want through the
political process is not a case of unfreedom in the sense of domination if you
share equally with others the control of the state. If the fact that a decision
goes against you can be seen as tough luck rather than as a result of a will that
operated independently of the process in which you were an equal participant,
then you are neither dominated nor unfree (Pettit 2012, pp. 177–178).
It might be responded that this is all very well, but getting what one wants
is also part of being free. I accept this, and it raises an issue I will address pre-
sently. However, it is crucial also to see that democratic procedures do express
a form of freedom by securing the equal non-dominated standing of everyone.
It is part of being non-dominated and free to be able to try to achieve one’s
aims in politics without having to bow and scrape for others and to be able to
be heard and to inﬂuence common lawmaking. But this equal standing, you
might say, requires that everyone have an equal chance of actually inﬂuencing
the results of democratic lawmaking, and there might be members of our soci-
eties who do not have such a possibility because they predictably will never be
on the winning side. On my view, this is an institutional problem, rather than a
problem with the democratic ideal. The objection arises when one identiﬁes
democracy with majority rule. If, and when, majoritarian decision procedures
can be shown not to secure for everyone an equal chance of inﬂuencing the
outcome, then these procedures can be criticized on the equality and freedom
grounds that were supposed to justify them in the ﬁrst place (Richardson 2002,
pp. 11ff., Pettit 2012, pp. 214–215). We must ﬁnd, therefore, other procedures
through which equal control and inﬂuence and, hence, non-domination can be
secured. I cannot go into a discussion of institutional design here, but it is
worth noting that actual democracies already include institutional mechanisms
that aim to protect the interests and inﬂuence of members of permanent majori-
ties.
It is an often-repeated criticism of the claim that freedom and democracy
are intrinsically related that it gives priority to political freedom over private
freedom and that in fact ‘most people tend to ﬁnd more fulﬁllment in the pri-
vate sphere. They would rather cultivate their garden than the public good’
(Bellamy 2008, p. 162). From this viewpoint, it would appear unproblematic
for a little political freedom to be traded off for a lot of private freedom so as
to increase overall freedom (Christiano 1996, pp. 19, 26). This objection seems
to take for granted the perspective of someone who already enjoys both private
and public freedom, and it is true that many of us who are lucky enough to
have both kinds of freedom give greater importance to private than to political
freedom. The question is whether it makes sense outside this perspective to
speak of private and political freedom as each having a given meaning or
value that can constitute a trade-off problem. The objection implies that there
are two different kinds of freedom, private and political, each making it
possible to partake in different kinds of activities and that the value of each is
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independent of whether one enjoys the other. This view presupposes the notion
of freedom as non-interference and shares the Hobbes–Berlin assumption that
we can enjoy the same kind of freedom with or without democracy. The
republican view, by contrast, is that there is a different kind of freedom that
we can enjoy only in a democracy. It is only when citizens control the political
power and interference of the state to which they are subject that they are free
from living under an alien political will and from having political masters. This
type of freedom is simply unavailable in non-democratic regimes. Moreover,
the freedom subjects lack in non-democratic regimes is not a special ‘political’
freedom, for the enjoyment of their ‘private’ freedom is affected by the lack of
democratic control over their rulers. Without democracy, citizens will live at
the mercy of others who determine the extent and status of their ‘private’
freedom.
6. The priority of procedure over outcome
I have argued that understanding freedom as non-domination rather than as
non-interference helps in responding to common objections to freedom argu-
ments for democracy. I have also suggested, pace Pettit, that the relationship
between freedom and democracy should be seen as intrinsic rather than instru-
mental. Indeed, I think republicans are well positioned to fend off epistemic
objections to intrinsic accounts of democratic legitimacy.
As mentioned above, Estlund objects to intrinsic accounts that they are
insufﬁcient for explaining the importance of democratic procedures, since the
values of equality and fairness are also satisﬁed by other procedures.7 Estlund
sees the appeal of equality or fairness arguments for democracy as a product
of a dynamic of retreat. Fair procedures only become important when there is
disagreement over what to do or when there is skepticism about independent
criteria for good outcomes. ‘It is an important fact,’ Estlund (2008, p. 71)
claims, ‘that the idea of a fair procedure would not even arise if it were com-
mon knowledge that everyone agreed about what the correct decision is’; this
fact ‘reﬂects a certain intuitive priority of substance over procedure.’ The trou-
ble for the equality argument is that the dynamic of retreat will do away not
only with substantive equality, but also with the idea that democratic decisions
should be responsive to citizens’ views. This retreat will leave the fair procedu-
ralist with a very thin notion of equality, which cannot explain why democratic
procedures as we know them are to be preferred over and above a coin ﬂip.
From a republican perspective, it is clear that Estlund fails to consider that
democratic procedures might be important for a third reason (beyond and inde-
pendently of disagreement and skepticism), namely as necessary for the protec-
tion and promotion of freedom. An account of democratic legitimacy that is
grounded in freedom as non-domination rejects the intuitive priority of sub-
stance over procedure and thus avoids the dynamic of retreat objection. A core
insight of republicanism is that freedom ‘requires independency on the will of
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others, even the goodwill of others’ (Pettit 2012, p. 184, see also pp. 59, 63).
The paradigmatic case of dependence on the goodwill of another is the slave’s
subjection to a benevolent master. The slave is a slave and, hence, unfree even
if her master never interferes with her, because the master has the power to
interfere with the slave’s choices (see Pettit 1997, pp. 31ff., 52, 63–64, 2012,
p. 50).8 The central point is that freedom is a status ‘that we cannot provide
for one another on the basis of our own goodwill’; it can be secured only by
‘external checks’ and, in the ﬁnal analysis, ‘a just and democratic state’ (Pettit
2012, pp. 63, 183–184). Citizens who merely agree on what the correct deci-
sion is have nothing to rely on but each other’s goodwill. Agreement might
give them the outcome they want, but it does not by itself secure their status
freedom.
The weakness of the idea that substance has priority over procedure is that
it assumes that legitimacy is only about getting what one wants and fails to
consider the relations in which citizens stand to each other. The ideal of non-
domination, as mentioned, is not about securing a certain outcome by no mat-
ter what means. The republican insight is that democratic legitimacy is not
merely about getting what one wants, but also about how one gets it, about
standing in relations of non-domination to one’s co-citizens and the state.
Moreover, the problem with Estlund’s insistence on the priority of substance
over procedure is that it requires that your own will, and the will of others
remain the same, while freedom as non-domination requires that your status
freedom remains the same even in the case that your own will or the will of
others changes. Only if your control of the outcome is ‘unconditioned’ in this
way does it meet the ideal of non-domination (Pettit 2012, pp. 67, 167,
170ff.).
The priority of the procedural value of non-domination over substantive
agreement can be established in a different way. To say that all agree that a
certain decision is correct is tantamount to saying that everyone is convinced
that it is the correct decision. But we cannot say that a group of people is con-
vinced about something without knowing something about how they came to
be convinced. If the ‘agreement’ was a product of deception, manipulation,
fear, or other forms of domination, we would not say that everyone was con-
vinced of the correctness of the decision – even if all accepted it (Habermas
1990). Common knowledge of the fact that everyone agrees on a certain deci-
sion as correct presupposes common knowledge that the procedures and condi-
tions for coming to agreement were of a certain kind. It is only when the
agreement is presumed to be produced under conditions of non-domination that
the idea of a fair procedure does not arise as an explicit concern. If in an
actual situation people mistakenly think the agreement is genuine, i.e. not a
product of domination, this means only that the issue of procedure does not
arise for the parties involved, but this is hardly a good reason for thinking that
it should not arise for normative political theory.
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7. Conclusion
This paper has argued for four main points. First, contemporary republicanism
and its ideal of freedom as non-domination contain important theoretical
resources for grounding democracy in freedom. Second, to develop the latter
ideal, we must challenge hostility to intrinsic arguments for democracy and
show that the relationship between freedom and democracy is non-instrumen-
tal. Third, grounding democracy in non-domination enables us to respond to
standard objections to freedom arguments for democracy. Finally, the proposed
freedom argument for democracy can better meet the epistemic challenge to
intrinsic accounts than the equality argument.9
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Notes
1. Nadia Urbinati (2012) has shown in a recent article the anti-democratic aspects of
Roman and neo-Roman republicanism. While I agree with Urbinati that neo-Roman
republicanism is insufﬁciently democratic (Rostbøll 2008, ch. 2), I think she fails to
see that and how republicans such as Philip Pettit seek to ground democracy in free-
dom. This is particularly clear in Pettit’s recent book, On the people’s terms (2012),
which I see as responding to some of the earlier criticisms of his republicanism for
being only minimally democratic or aristocratic (e.g. McCormick 2011, pp. 145ff.).
2. Rousseau writes, ‘[I]n giving himself to all, each person gives himself to no one’
(Rousseau 1987, p. 148).
3. Thus, Pettit (2012, p. 12) is wrong in seeing Arendt as a Rousseauian or communi-
tarian republican.
4. For an explicit republican defense of democratic instrumentalism, see Lovett (2010,
pp. 210ff.).
5. Pettit’s insistence on seeing democracy as merely instrumental to freedom as non-
domination is explicit in Republicanism (1997, pp. 8, 30), though this point is not
emphasized in his more recent On the people’s terms (2012).
6. I have previously criticized Pettit’s epistemic account for its undemocratic tenden-
cies (Rostbøll 2008, ch. 2).
7. Here I draw on an earlier discussion of Estlund’s epistemic challenge to intrinsic
accounts of democracy (Rostbøll forthcoming).
8. See Richardson (2002, p. 34) and Rostbøll (2008, pp. 48–49; 2014, pp. 26ff.) for
qualiﬁcations to the formulation that domination is merely a matter of capacity or
power to interfere.
9. I elaborate on the freedom argument for democracy elsewhere (Rostbøll forthcoming).
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